A new independent technical report submitted to the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has found that the programme has generated significant macroeconomic benefits for Ghana, overwhelmingly outweighing the Bank of Ghana’s (BoG) reported trading losses.
The report, titled “Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod)”, was authored by Prof. Festus Ebo Turkson and Peter Junior Dotse of the Department of Economics, University of Ghana, together with Prof. Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako of the University of Ghana Business School. It was dated January 4, 2026.
Using conservative assumptions and verifiable data, the study assessed GoldBod’s impact on gold smuggling, foreign exchange inflows and overall macroeconomic stability.
Sharp Decline in Gold Smuggling
The report concludes that GoldBod has substantially reduced gold smuggling, particularly in the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector.
Official ASM gold exports increased from 63.6 tonnes in 2024 to 103.0 tonnes in 2025, representing an additional 39.4 tonnes. The authors argue that most of this increase reflects gold previously smuggled out of the country but now channelled through formal systems.
Valued conservatively at about US$96.5 million per tonne, the additional volume injected approximately US$3.8 billion into Ghana’s formal foreign exchange market.
Benefits Dwarf BoG Trading Loss
The report directly contrasts these gains with the US$214 million trading loss reported by the BoG and referenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It finds that foreign exchange gains from reduced smuggling alone exceed the reported loss by roughly 18 times. According to the authors, formalising just 2.2 tonnes of gold exports would have offset the BoG’s reported loss—far below the nearly 40-tonne increase recorded.
Massive Savings From Non-Debt FX Inflows
GoldBod’s role in generating non-debt foreign exchange inflows is identified as a major fiscal advantage.
ASM gold exports channelled through GoldBod in 2025 are estimated at US$10.8 billion. If Ghana had raised a similar amount through external borrowing, annual interest costs would have ranged between US$756 million and US$1.08 billion, based on interest rates of 7–10 per cent.
Even when focusing only on reduced smuggling, the report estimates avoided annual interest costs of US$266–380 million, stressing that these savings recur annually rather than representing one-off gains.
Wider Macroeconomic Gains
Beyond foreign exchange inflows, the study credits GoldBod with supporting broader macroeconomic improvements, including:
International reserves rising to about US$11–12 billion
Exchange-rate stabilisation and appreciation relative to IMF projections
A reduction in the domestic cost of servicing external debt, estimated at GHS 6.2 billion
A lower import bill between January and October 2025, valued at GHS 50.6 billion
Easing inflationary pressures through reduced exchange-rate pass-through
Rethinking the BoG “Loss”
The report challenges public interpretation of the BoG’s reported loss, describing much of it as an accounting translation effect rather than a real cash loss.
It explains that gold is purchased at near-retail exchange rates to discourage smuggling, while foreign exchange inflows are recorded at lower interbank rates, creating accounting discrepancies. The actual economic cost of the programme—covering fees, purity losses and offtake discounts—is estimated at about 2.5 per cent of the value of gold traded, far below the headline loss figures.
Policy Recommendations
The authors recommend maintaining price competitiveness to prevent a return to smuggling, improving transparency in BoG reporting by clearly separating accounting effects from real economic costs, and gradually reducing policy costs as foreign exchange market conditions stabilise.
They also call for stronger governance and oversight, careful management of transition risks as GoldBod expands its trading role, and sustained fiscal discipline and law enforcement to deter illegal gold exports. The report further suggests that GoldBod’s policy costs be treated as a quasi-fiscal expense and explicitly funded through the national budget.
A Stabilisation Tool, Not a Profit Venture
The report concludes that GoldBod should be understood not as a profit-seeking trading institution but as a macroeconomic stabilisation and formalisation tool.
Based on the evidence, the authors describe GoldBod as a high-return policy intervention that has strengthened Ghana’s external position, reduced reliance on costly external borrowing and contributed meaningfully to macroeconomic stability.
Story: Nyamebeye Kofi Ansah Sasraku